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Is Irish Utility Regulation Failing Consumers? 
 
 
 
Abstract: Over the past decade the energy and communications markets in Ireland, 
which were traditionally the preserve of State owned monopolies, have been opened up to 
competition to some extent, largely as a result of EU legislation. This has resulted in 
changes in the regulatory environment and the establishment of independent regulatory 
agencies for these industries. The present paper analyses the impact of these changes. It 
argues that competition, wherever it is possible, is superior to regulation. The paper 
suggests that policy to date has paid too little attention to measures necessary to promote 
greater competition and that regulation has failed to protect consumers. The paper 
concludes that active measures are necessary to promote greater competition in gas, 
electricity and postal services and that these need to be combined with reforms of the 
existing regulatory regime. 
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Introduction. 
Europe’s energy and telecommunications industries have undergone major changes over 
the past decade. EU Directives required Member States to open up their national markets 
to competitors from other Member States.2 Introducing competition in monopolised 
industries should increase productive efficiency, leading to lower prices, and lead to a 
greater alignment between prices and costs, thereby enhancing allocative efficiency. The 
present paper argues that the reforms implemented to date have been inadequate and that 
regulation of such industries in Ireland is deficient in a number of important respects. The 
paper considers some possible solutions to these problems.  
 
Electricity and gas prices have risen by 40% and 22% respectively since December 
2001.3 (See fig.1)  
Fig.1: Irish Gas and Electricity Prices
(Dec 2001 = 100)
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Notes: The 2004 estimates are based on CSO data up to August 2004 and incorporate price increases for 
gas and electricity which took effect on 1st October 2004. The 2005 forecast includes a further 3.5% 
increase in electricity prices scheduled to take effect on 1st January 2005 and assumes no further price rises.  
Source: CSO and Compecon estimates. 
 
Rising oil prices only partly explain the sharp rise in electricity prices. The National 
Competitiveness Council (2004) reported that Irish industrial electricity prices were 
                                                 
2 Telecommunications was fully liberalised in 1998, full liberalisation of gas and electricity markets for 
smaller customers is scheduled to take place early in 2005, while liberalisation of the postal service is at a 
much earlier stage. 
3 This takes into account a 3.5% increase in electricity prices due to take effect on 1st January 2005.  
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among the most expensive in the EU even before a 9% price increase in October 2004.4 
UK electricity prices were 40% lower than in Ireland for firms consuming 10 GWh. 
 
Fixed line telephone charges declined by over 30% between 1997 and 2001 but have 
risen by 9% over the past three years. (See Fig.2) Eircom’s line rental charges are double 
the European average.5 Postal charges have increased by almost 25% in three years and 
An Post had sought a further 7 cent (14.6%) increase, although subsequent newspaper 
reports indicate that this is unlikely to be granted by ComReg.6 Senior (2004) reports that 
the standard price of a postage stamp in New Zealand, which has fully liberalised the 
postal sector, was unchanged on its 1989 level of nz45c.  
 
Fig.2:  Irish Fixed Line Telephone and Postal Charges 
(Dec 2001 = 100)
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Notes: The 2004 estimates for are based on CSO data up to June projected forward, i.e. assuming no further 
price increases this year.    
Source: CSO and Compecon estimates. 
 
ESB profits before interest and tax in 2003 amounted to €354m, with 61% of this 
attributed to the transmission and distribution network. Pay levels in the electricity 
industry have risen sharply relative to those in other industries since mid 2001. (See 
                                                 
4 Ireland was second most expensive out of ten countries for firms purchasing 10GWh; 3rd most expensive 
(out of nine countries) for firms purchasing 25GWh and 3rd most expensive (out of eight countries) for 70 
GWh. 
5 Sunday Business Post, 12.9.2004. 
6 Sunday Business Post, 14.11.2004. 
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Fig.3). Average weekly industrial earnings in the electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply sector in June 2004 were €1,157.47, more than twice average weekly industrial 
earnings which stood at €560.60. According to newspaper reports, more than one ESB 
board member “is understood to have commented at a board meeting that the company 
was doing very well out of the regulation process”.7 
 
Fig. 3: Average Weekly Earnings of Industrial Workers
(1995q3 = 100) 
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Not surprisingly such price increases have led to growing resentment among consumers 
and business. IBEC claimed that the energy market was not working and that a new 
approach was needed to ensure security of supply at a reasonable cost.8 The NCC (2004, 
p.ii) stated bluntly that: 
“Better regulation is needed in sectors such as energy, telecoms and professional 
services to ensure more vigorous competition and drive down the cost of doing 
business in Ireland.” 
 
Regulation – What Have we Learned? 
                                                 
7 Irish Independent, 2.10.2003, Why Regulation is Good for ESB. 
8 Irish Times, 9.2.2004.  
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Traditionally gas, electricity and telecommunications were regarded as natural 
monopolies which had to be regulated to prevent the abuse of monopoly power. In 
Ireland, as in many European countries, State ownership was viewed as a way of ensuring 
these industries were operated in the public interest.9 (Hotelling, 1938). In the US such 
industries were generally privately owned with the scope for abuse of market power 
regulated by profit or rate of return regulation. 
 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a growing realisation that traditional forms 
of regulation were ineffective. The economic literature highlighted regulators’ inability to 
achieve first-best outcomes due to information asymmetries, which enable the regulated 
firm to set price above cost and gain a socially-costly rent from its activities. (See Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993 and Laffont, 1994). Nationalising such industries creates highly 
centralised organisations in which information is asymmetrically distributed in favour of 
management, making it difficult to exercise effective public control. (Schick, 1993)10 
Regulatory agencies are also prone to bureaucratic capture resulting in an inherent bias 
toward increasing their activities. Such considerations resulted in a major reappraisal of 
public policy towards the energy and communications industries, beginning in the United 
States and Britain in the early 1980s and subsequently spreading to other countries. 
 
It was recognised that, while the transmission and distribution networks in gas and 
electricity are natural monopolies, other activities are potentially competitive. The reform 
programmes introduced in most countries generally had two broad characteristics. 
1. Measures to permit competition in potentially competitive segments of utility 
industries, reflecting a view that competition was superior to regulation; and  
2. In natural monopoly areas, where regulation remains necessary, attempts were 
made to devise more effective regulatory tools designed to reduce the risk of 
regulatory capture. 
                                                 
9 Electricity and telecommunications were historically state monopolies, while the gas industry consisted of 
a small number of local urban monopolies, which were largely privately owned. With the replacement of 
town gas by natural gas in the 1980s, the old town gas companies were acquired by the State owned BGE.  
10 Lawson (1992) describes how, in the UK, the CEGB misled successive Governments about the true cost 
of nuclear plants, something which only emerged on the eve of the UK electricity privatisation.  
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Regulation has frequently been seen as a necessary temporary measure “to hold the fort” 
until competition develops. (Littlechild, 1999) 
 
Promoting Competitive Markets. 
New entrants in gas and electricity must be able to access the natural monopoly network 
if they are to compete with the incumbent provider. A vertically integrated incumbent has 
obvious incentives to deny access to the network or to grant it on unfavourable terms. It 
is extremely difficult for a regulator to establish the true costs of providing access and 
vertically integrated incumbents have an incentive to overstate them.  
“The pricing of access to essential facilities can be complex even when their 
ownership is separate from competitive activities, but it is especially controversial 
when there is vertical integration.” (Vickers, 1998, p.34) 
 
In contrast, the unintegrated owner of a transmission network would never have an 
incentive to refuse to deal unilaterally. Vertical separation of the natural monopoly 
elements from the potentially competitive segments of the gas and electricity industries 
greatly simplifies the task of regulating access charges and is thus more effective at 
fostering competition.11 (See, for example, Armstrong et. al., 1994; Littlechild, 2003; 
Newbery, 2001; OECD, 2001; and United States Federal Trade Commission, 2000). 
Accounting separation is not enough, as it is very difficult for a regulator to ensure that 
costs are correctly apportioned between different business activities.  
 
The issues in telecommunications are somewhat different to those in gas and electricity. 
Rapid technological change and the growth in rival mobile networks mean that the 
natural monopoly problem may no longer arise. (Ricketts, 2004). Littlechild (2004) 
nevertheless argued for the vertical split up of BT, pointing out that, whereas price 
regulation had been removed in UK gas and electricity markets it remained in place for 
telecommunications.  
 
                                                 
11 International experience indicates that the potential gains from competition outweigh the loss of 
economies of scope that result from vertical integration. 
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The incumbent will typically have inherited a dominant position as a result of its former 
protected monopoly status and this may also stymie new entry. In the case of electricity 
Bergman et. al. (1999, p.229) concluded that “competitive outcomes cannot be reached 
without sufficient dispersion of the ownership of generation assets.” Nuttall (2000), 
Newberry (2001) and Littlechild (2003) all stress the importance of horizontal 
restructuring in electricity. 
 
Dealing with Information Asymmetries. 
Price cap regulation attempts to overcome the information asymmetry problem by 
encouraging the regulated firm to reveal accurate information about the potential for cost 
reductions. The price cap is supposed to provide a strong incentive for the regulated firm 
to achieve greater cost savings than those set by the regulator, since this will increase its 
profits. This in turn provides more accurate information to the regulator about potential 
efficiency gains when the price cap is due for review.12  
 
Regulation is a repeated game which provides scope for strategic behaviour by the 
regulated firm. It will recognise that, while it can retain additional efficiency gains in the 
short-run, such gains will lead to tighter price caps in the future. (See Laffont and Tirole, 
2003). Giulieti and Waddams-Price (2000), in a study of the effects of price caps in UK 
utilities, along with airports and telecoms in the US, found “little evidence that firms had 
moved towards more efficient pricing structures” under price cap constraints. They 
reported evidence of considerable gaming around the time of price reviews in an attempt 
to get price caps raised as much as possible. In contrast they report a move toward cost 
reflective pricing where competition had been introduced.  
 
Noll (1995) pointed out that high profits in public utilities were considered unacceptable 
politically and regulators in both the US and UK were forced to take action to reduce 
them, thereby reducing the incentive effects of price caps. 
                                                 
12 Setting price caps for a basket of products simplifies the task of the regulator and allows the firm 
flexibility to adjust prices in response to changes in costs and increase profits. Provided the price cap 
ensures that consumers, as a whole, are not worse off as a result of such price increases, the result is 
increased social welfare. Flexibility also enables the firm to unwind any cross-subsidies which may exist. 
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 It was originally claimed that price cap regulation would be simpler to operate, and less 
vulnerable to producer capture than traditional rate of return regulation. Littlechild 
(1986) subsequently conceded that “rate of return considerations are necessarily implicit 
in setting and resetting x”. Price capping is therefore a highly complex process involving 
considerable information requirements and assumptions about cost and demand, as well 
as predictions as to future changes in cost and demand. Pollitt (1999) notes that poorly 
constructed incentive regulation may negate many of the positive benefits from reform. 
Laffont and Tirole (2003) and Laffont (2004) also question the efficacy of price-cap 
regulation. 
 
Massey and O’Hare (1996) pointed out that price capping assumes that firms are profit 
maximisers and relies on the incentive to increase profits to induce firms to reveal 
information to the regulator. It is designed to apply to private sector firms. Dodgson 
(2003) argued that price capping was unsuitable for regulating the UK Post Office for 
similar reasons. 
 
Why Regulation isn’t Working. 
The EU Directives on opening up energy and communications markets only set out 
certain general principles and left Member States considerable scope to decide how such 
measures should be implemented. As Waverman and Sirrel (1997, p.115) noted: 
“Experience in many countries shows that the devil is in the detail and that 
competition does not arrive overnight.” 
Cave and Prosperetti (2001, p.111) describe “the appalling record of some Member 
States in implementing [telecommunications] directives.” Littlechild (2003) has criticised 
France and Germany for failing to introduce competition in their respective electricity 
markets. The then EU Commissioner for the Internal Market described liberalisation of 
the energy market as “still incomplete because two big players, Germany and France, lag 
behind.” (Bolkenstein, 2004, p.126) 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 9
In both voice telephony and electricity Ireland sought and obtained a two year derogation 
from implementing the relevant EU Directives, suggesting a certain lack of enthusiasm 
for competition. In arguing for the derogation for voice telephony the Government 
claimed that the ICTU had threatened to withdraw from national pay agreements if the 
telecommunications sector was liberalised.13 Similar threats were made in response to 
proposals to introduce competition in airports and bus services. Massey (1991) warned 
that social partnership could obstruct regulatory reform and impose significant hidden 
costs on the economy.  
 
To date little attempt has been made at restructuring the gas or electricity industries to 
promote greater competition.14 BGE remains vertically integrated. It was proposed that 
responsibility for control of the electricity transmission network would be transferred to a 
new independent company known as Eirgrid but ESB was to retain ownership of the 
network and be responsible for building additional capacity and maintenance work. 
Eirgrid’s establishment has been delayed for a number of years, apparently because ESB 
National Grid staff are reluctant to transfer to the proposed new company. The managing 
director of the ESB National Grid observed: 
“If these structural decisions cannot be taken, some other decision must be found 
that does not depend on markets and recognises that competition will not play a 
major role in the allocation of resources in the industry”. 15 
 
The CER, in a letter to the Minister in December 2003, conceded that the proposals for 
separation of ownership and control of the electricity grid were flawed. It recommended 
that Eirgrid be abolished and that the transmission system should be owned and 
controlled by a wholly-owned ESB subsidiary. It pointed out that, while some 
commentators would advocate full separation, the EU Directives did not require this.16 
 
                                                 
13 Commission Decision of 27.11.1996, 1997 OJ L41, 12.2.1997, p.8. The telecommunications derogation 
was subsequently waived 13 months early apparently due to concerns that foreign direct investment was 
threatened by the lack of competition in telecommunications. 
14 The Government has taken a rather different approach to airports by breaking up Aer Rianta. 
15 Statement of Kieran O’Brien, MD ESB National Grid to Oireachtas Joint Committee on 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, 20.6.2004. 
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In a subsequent published report, however, the CER (2004) conceded that “…a 
comprehensive structural approach would….largely but not completely, address ESB’s 
market dominance” but then argued:  
1. It did not have the authority to order a break-up and so could not rely on such a 
solution. – It could recommend such an approach to the Government as being in the 
best interests of customers.  
2. Structural change takes time – hardly a good reason for rejecting it. 
3. The large size of some ESB power plants mean some market power problems 
would remain. As Borenstein et. al. (1999) argued “even with some market power 
present in the electricity industry the result is likely to be an improvement on 
traditional regulation.” 
 
The CER announced that it was “not ruling out future structural changes to ESB, but will 
develop a regulatory approach that will, in the absence of any structural reforms, ensure a 
market that works well and will achieve many, if not all market benefits.” Regulation 
simply cannot deliver such benefits. 
“Governments and regulators do not know what market outcomes would be and so, 
in general they cannot simulate such outcomes.”(Robinson, 2004, p.191)  
The CER subsequently announced that it was reviewing its proposals for new market 
arrangements for electricity (MAE). 
 
The CER invited the ESB to prepare proposals on how it should be regulated and then 
sought submissions on these proposals from third parties. Previously the CER sought 
comments on BGE’s proposals for regulating the gas market. This effectively allowed the 
incumbent firms to set the regulatory agenda. 
 
Price Regulation. 
Massey and Daly (2003) report how ComReg rewarded Eircom and An Post, in spite of 
evidence of serious inefficiencies. The latter firm had also failed to achieve service 
targets set by the regulator. If the regulator simply allows monopolists to pass on the cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 Competition 13(2), p.30. 
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of inefficiencies to their customers, which is what an unregulated monopolist would do, it 
begs the obvious question – why have a regulator?  
 
In gas, electricity and postal services, the regulators have decided on price increases by 
analysing the cost structure of the regulated firms and allowing some provision for a 
profit margin. Such an approach ignores the fact that the regulator has insufficient 
information to decide whether costs are justified or not – it cannot prevent gold-plating - 
and provides no incentives for the regulated firms to cut costs. In such circumstances 
prices are unlikely to differ from what an unregulated monopolist would charge. The 
CER (2001) has sought to regulate prices at a detailed level. 
 “As well as the overall increases in tariffs the Commission reviewed and 
determined the structure of each tariff.” 
The ESB unions have reportedly sought a pay increase of 18.5%. Either there are 
significant monopoly rents or the unions are better informed than the CER about the 
scope for efficiency gains.  
 
Protecting Competitors 
Regulation provides an incentive for firms to devote resources toward obtaining 
favourable regulatory treatment so that the regulator may end up protecting competitors 
at the expense of competition.  
 The regulator opposed proposals to auction 3G mobile phone licences because 
firms might bid too high a price. This assumes that companies do not learn from 
mistakes and have to be protected from making poor commercial decisions.  
 Eircom cannot offer high volume users lower prices than those approved by the 
regulator. McAvoy (1996) described how such price controls limit competition. 
 The regulator has prohibited Eircom from approaching customers who switch to a 
rival provider for a period of three months, following complaints by rivals about 
aggressive approaches by Eircom to customers that had switched supplier. 
 The regulator supported its decision to ease Eircom’s price cap in 2003 by stating 
that other licensed operators had asked for this “so that they can achieve the 
increasing returns expected by their financiers.” It went on to state: “From the 
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Such measures are unlikely to foster “sharp-edged” competition. 
 
Learning to Let Go 
Many commentators argue that the real risk in telecommunications is that regulation may 
prevent rather than promote competition. (See, for example, Harris and Kraft, 1997; 
MacAvoy, 1996; Sidak, 2004). Crandall (2003, p.171) argues that “it is difficult to see 
how total deregulation [of telecommunications] could possibly reduce economic 
welfare.” Hausman and Tardiff (1997) identified losses in consumer surplus because 
regulation delayed the introduction of voicemail in the US.  
 
Fig.4: Irish Mobile Phone Charges
(Dec 2001 = 100)
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Regulators nevertheless display a marked reluctance to relinquish control even when 
there is widespread evidence of effective competition. Fig. 4 shows that Irish mobile 
phone charges have fallen dramatically with prices in 2004 at a quarter of their 1997 
level. Massey and Daly (2003) point out that the regulator has nevertheless consistently 
argued that there is insufficient competition in mobile telephony. Waverman (2003) 
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claims that regulators may be the only group that regards perfect competition as an ideal 
to be aimed at. 
 
The EU has sought to move away from ex ante regulation toward a reliance on general 
competition law in telecommunications. Only firms deemed to possess significant market 
power (SMP) can be subject to ex ante regulation, where SMP is defined as being 
equivalent to the competition law concept of dominance. ComReg has decided, however, 
that all mobile phone operators have significant market power in respect of call 
termination on their own networks, although one of them had a 6% share of the mobile 
phone market, while another has yet to commence operations. The theoretical grounds for 
such a finding are somewhat mixed. (See Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a and b and 
Dessein, 2003). 
 
ComReg (2003) dismissed a 30% reduction in call termination charges by the two largest 
mobile operators since the beginning of 1999 as being due to regulation rather than 
competition. It argued that consumers had no alternative to terminating a call on a given 
network and could not switch to an alternative. Yet ComReg requires that consumers 
making calls to another network receive a message informing them that this might 
involve a higher charge. ComReg also argued that Eircom’s decision to pass on the full 
reduction in mobile call termination charges to its customers indicated that it lacked 
countervailing buyer power and could not therefore exert a restraining influence on 
mobile termination rates. Such a response might suggest that Eircom lacked market 
power in the downstream market rather than indicate a lack of buyer power. Baker (2004) 
points out that even a monopolist will pass on a large proportion of any reduction in its 
variable costs. 
  
Counting the Cost of Regulation 
Total expenditure by the CAR, CER and ComReg in 2002 amounted to €22.5m. (See 
Table 1). This is roughly seven times the cost of the Competition Authority whose remit 
covers the entire economy. ComReg’s costs were more than twice those of the CER and 
four times those of the CAR. In February 2003 the Minister issued a formal direction to 
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ComReg to keep its costs to a minimum under section 13 of the Communications 
Regulation Act, 2002. Whether this will suffice to curb monopoly regulatory rents is a 
moot point.  
 
Table 1: Regulatory Costs (€M) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
CER 1.25 7.16 4.67 5.98 
ComReg 14.32 15.94 14.90 13.27 
CAR 2.63 3.29 
Total 15.57 23.10 22.20 22.54 
Source: ODTR Annual Reports, CER Financial Statements, various years. 
 
Direct regulatory costs represent only a fraction of the true cost of such a regime. The 
main cost of regulation is due to compliance costs, which are borne by the industry and 
for the most part are never even measured. In effect regulation suffers from a form of 
negative externality since the direct costs of regulation borne by the regulator are less 
than the cost to society resulting in an excessive level of regulation from society’s point 
of view. 
 
Massey and Daly (2003) cite the example the regulator setting higher next day delivery 
targets for postal services. Even a small increase in the next day delivery target may have 
significant marginal cost implications as postal services display peak loading 
characteristics. Thus there is a danger that higher costs may outweigh any benefits from 
higher delivery targets.17 As the regulator does not bear those costs it has an in-built bias 
towards setting higher targets which enable it to claim that it is trying to improve services 
for customers. Introducing a second class postage rates that would involve a lower charge 
in return for slower delivery, say 2-3 days as opposed to next day, would allow 
consumers rather than the regulator to decide the level of next day delivery required, 
while easing the peak load problem and reducing costs. 
                                                 
17 An Post has announced plans to hire consultants to investigate whether the target is achievable at a 
reported cost of up to €500,000. 
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 The existence of information asymmetries, combined with the fact that both incumbents 
and new entrants have an incentive to mislead the regulator, also has important cost 
implications. Incorrect regulatory decisions are likely to impose significant costs on the 
economy as investment decisions and competitive strategies of firms will be misdirected.  
 
Regulatory Accountability 
Regulators are themselves monopolies, which suggests that there is a need to ensure that 
they are subject to an adequate level of accountability. Levine (1998), however, claimed 
that “…the welter of information that the public receives about political issues from the 
media and the difficulties of organising to achieve political ends insulate regulators from 
monitoring and general interest pressures…” Westrup (2002) found that Oireachtas 
Committees had failed to properly oversee the activities of regulatory bodies because of a 
combination of inability; ignorance or partiality; and lack of interest. He observed that 
“the Oireachtas has shown little enthusiasm for carrying out its scrutiny role” (p.55) and 
described “the apparent unwillingness of different Oireachtas committees to meet with 
the different regulators on even an annual basis is an indication of a reluctance to take 
seriously a scrutiny role”. It appears that committees only take an interest in the activities 
of regulators when such issues become hot topics politically and present an opportunity 
for political points scoring. This of course does not permit for the sort of detailed and in-
depth performance reviews that are necessary. 
 
Getting the Market Structure Right 
The lesson from other countries is that, where competition is possible, it is far superior to 
regulation at increasing efficiency and ensuring the lowest possible prices to consumers. 
(Kahn, 1988) Policies which seek to limit competition, and rely instead on regulation to 
safeguard the interests of public utility customers are therefore misguided. As Stelzer 
(2001, p.7) observed with regard to UK regulatory agencies: 
“…it was somewhere between foolishness and wild optimism for the government to 
imagine that regulation is a process that can be performed by a few folks applying 
uncontroversial techniques to determine prices that will be fair to consumers and at 
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the same time yield returns adequate, but no more than adequate, to attract capital 
in sufficient quantities to maintain service at acceptable levels.” 
Borenstein et. al. (1999) point out market power problems may persist in electricity even 
when there are a number of competing generators, but nevertheless argue that 
competition is superior to regulation.  
 
Equally it must be recognised that simply permitting entry will not lead to the emergence 
of competitive markets in gas and electricity. The objective of policy should be to ensure 
that, in five years time, regulation will only remain necessary in the case of the natural 
monopoly transmission and distribution networks. Achieving this aim is likely to require 
some restructuring in gas and electricity. The ownership and control of the transmission 
and distribution networks needs to be transferred to companies that are independent of 
ESB and BGE. In the case of gas, approximately 80% of the market in volume terms is 
currently open to competition. While BGE still has 100% of the household and small 
business market, horizontal restructuring of its supply business would appear 
unnecessary.  
 
Electricity is more complex. The ESB (2003) has committed itself to reducing its market 
share of electricity generation to 60% “to facilitate the entry of new competitors.” This is 
unlikely to result in an adequate level of competition, particularly as ESB would still 
have 100% of the peak plants which effectively set the price for generation.18 It has been 
suggested that the Republic of Ireland electricity market is too small to permit 
competition; although Littlechild (2003) reports that competition is being considered in 
countries with a total generation requirement of 1,000MW or less.  
 
There are proposals for the creation of a single all island electricity market and for the 
construction of inter-connectors to Britain.19 IPA (2001) concluded, however, that action 
would be required to tackle ESB’s dominance in generation even in the context of an all 
                                                 
18 Borenstein (1999) has shown that firms with much smaller market shares may be able to wield market 
power in generation. 
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Ireland market.20 Borenstein et. al. (1999) reported that in parts of the US generators 
reduced the geographic size of the market by reducing output and causing congestion on 
the grid. Such experience suggests that increasing inter-connection capacity on its own 
might not suffice. Commenting on Swedish experience, Bergman et. al.(1999, p.229) 
concluded, that “it is better to rely on the redistribution of generation assets” whenever 
possible, because the benefits from market expansion “are likely to be more uncertain and 
less immediate.” 
 
Consideration should also be given to faster liberalisation of postal services. There is 
some evidence that final delivery may constitute a natural monopoly. In the UK rival 
operators handle the collection, transport and sorting and pay the Royal Mail for final 
delivery at a rate of 13p per item. Such mail can be sorted down to the level of individual 
delivery routes. (Senior, 2004) 
   
Reforming Ireland’s Regulatory Regime. 
Structural changes in gas and electricity need to be accompanied by significant reforms 
of the existing regulatory regime. Sharp price increases for gas, electricity and postal 
services in recent years has contributed to a growing public disenchantment with the 
regulatory process in Ireland and created a mistaken impression that competition in these 
industries has not worked. In many instances regulatory decisions simply summarise 
submissions of various parties and set out conclusions. (See, for example, CER, 2004). 
Stelzer (2001, p.105) has criticised such an approach in the UK. 
“This decision to establish a decision-making process that, to all intents and 
purposes, excluded consumers from participation relied on the very English notion 
that responsible chaps know what is best for the public.” 
 
There is a need for a properly resourced consumer body that is capable of undertaking the 
necessary research to present a counter case to the regulated firm. Greater transparency is 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Bergman, et. al. (1999) describe how Sweden, Norway and Finland expanded their national electricity 
markets by integrating them in this way. Interconnection capacity between Scotland and England is being 
increased in response to a lack of competition in Scotland. See Ofgem (2001). 
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required to restore credibility to price regulation. Future price reviews should be 
conducted by means of a public hearing. This would allow the arguments put forward by 
regulated firms to be challenged directly. It would also require those opposing price 
increases to present more rigorous arguments. The CER (2004) reported that submissions 
from trade and business associations opposing the October 2004 price increase argued: 
 Prices should not be increased because of a cumulative increase of 28% over the 
previous three years; 
 Price increases should be less than inflation because they are a significant cost to 
industry; and 
 Company’s operating budgets had been set for 2004 and included no provision for 
higher electricity charges.   
 
The existing regulatory agencies for energy, telecommunications and airports should be 
combined into a single regulatory agency. There would appear to be obvious economies 
of scale and scope suggesting that a merger would be beneficial, while such an agency 
might also be less prone to regulatory capture.  
 
Massey and Daly (2003) describe the current ad-hoc arrangements regarding appeals 
against regulatory decisions, with wide variations in the type of decisions by the different 
regulators that can be appealed and with appeals by customers against pricing decisions 
excluded except in the case of the aviation regulator. Customers and customer groups 
should have a right to appeal decisions on prices and price caps with a single appeals 
panel responsible for considering appeals against regulatory decisions. An appeal by the 
major airlines, who are the customers, led to the CAR reducing price caps for airports. 
There is a concern that the appeals body would become the de facto regulator and that 
parties would not engage in the initial regulatory decision making process but preserve 
their ammunition for an appeal. Firms generally tend to want such issues decided 
speedily and it is not in their interests to act in such a fashion. In order to discourage 
vexatious appeals, appellants could be required to bear the cost of unsuccessful appeals.  
                                                                                                                                                 
20 This need not involve privatisation of existing ESB plants. New Zealand, for example, privatised 40% of 
its generating capacity but the remaining 60% was split into three competing state companies. 
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 Waverman (2003, p.144) argues that regulatory creep is endemic by its nature as the 
regulator’s job is to regulate. “Hence blaming them for regulating is like blaming fish for 
swimming. There are only ways to restrain regulatory creep…” This is exacerbated by 
the fact that rivals have obvious incentives to complain to regulators about incumbent 
firms as they may benefit if the regulator restricts the ability of the incumbent to compete 
with them. He suggests that regulators should themselves be subject to a price cap while 
unsuccessful complainants should be required to bear the cost of investigations by the 
regulator. In Ireland’s case a price cap of CPI - 10% for the regulator(s) for five years 
would encourage moves towards developing effective competition and reducing the 
scope of regulation. The base point for the regulator’s price cap should reflect ComReg’s 
actual regulatory outlays rather than its revenue. 
 
Conclusion 
Little progress has been made to date in introducing competition in gas, electricity and 
postal services in Ireland. Arguably this is because too little consideration has been given 
to the introduction of measures necessary to bring about such competition. Policy has 
instead tended to favour regulation over competition. Such an approach is clearly 
misguided and will inevitably result in higher prices and a loss in allocative efficiency 
with consequent implications for industrial competitiveness. Technological developments 
have fostered increased competition in telecommunications in spite of such policy 
inadequacies. Greater emphasis must be placed on measures designed to promote 
competition, including restructuring in gas and electricity and a speeding up of measures 
to liberalise postal services. Such measures must be accompanied by policies designed to 
limit regulation to those areas that are genuine natural monopolies, something which 
regulators are unlikely to do if left to their own devices. 
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